{"product_id":"2940012611468","title":"AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS","description":"AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,\u003cbr\u003eof all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,\u003cbr\u003eentirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they\u003cbr\u003edefend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit\u003cbr\u003eof opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior\u003cbr\u003eto the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments\u003cbr\u003eis to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and\u003cbr\u003ethe same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.\u003cbr\u003eAnd as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his\u003cbr\u003etenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the\u003cbr\u003eaffections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThose who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked\u003cbr\u003eamong the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human\u003cbr\u003ecreature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions\u003cbr\u003ewere alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The\u003cbr\u003edifference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is\u003cbr\u003eso wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by\u003cbr\u003eeducation, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at\u003cbr\u003eonce under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,\u003cbr\u003eand scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all\u003cbr\u003edistinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,\u003cbr\u003ehe must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let\u003cbr\u003ehis prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are\u003cbr\u003esusceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting\u003cbr\u003ean antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding\u003cbr\u003ethat nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,\u003cbr\u003eat last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of\u003cbr\u003ecommon sense and reason.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThere has been a controversy started of late, much better worth\u003cbr\u003eexamination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether\u003cbr\u003ethey be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain\u003cbr\u003ethe knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an\u003cbr\u003eimmediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound\u003cbr\u003ejudgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every\u003cbr\u003erational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty\u003cbr\u003eand deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and\u003cbr\u003econstitution of the human species.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is\u003cbr\u003enothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider\u003cbr\u003emorals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the\u003cbr\u003eother hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the\u003cbr\u003ebeauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured\u003cbr\u003eto account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by\u003cbr\u003edeductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such\u003cbr\u003econfusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest\u003cbr\u003econsequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in\u003cbr\u003ethe parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very\u003cbr\u003elately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first\u003cbr\u003egave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered\u003cbr\u003eto the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from\u003cbr\u003ethe same confusion.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIt must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible\u003cbr\u003eof specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are\u003cbr\u003ediscernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in\u003cbr\u003ecommon life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the\u003cbr\u003elong chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,\u003cbr\u003ethe authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies\u003cbr\u003edetected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to\u003cbr\u003etheir proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists\u003cbr\u003ein the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each\u003cbr\u003eman feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in\u003cbr\u003egeometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the\u003cbr\u003eharmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must\u003cbr\u003egive immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but\u003cbr\u003efrequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions.","brand":"SAP","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47147378376944,"sku":"2940012611468","price":0.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/2940012611468_p0.jpg?v=1763570882","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/2940012611468","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}