{"product_id":"2940014478823","title":"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus","description":"INTRODUCTION\u003cbr\u003eBy BERTRAND RUSSELL\u003cbr\u003eMr Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, whether or\u003cbr\u003enot it prove to give the ultimate truth on the matters with which it deals,\u003cbr\u003ecertainly deserves, by its breadth and scope and profundity, to be considered\u003cbr\u003ean important event in the philosophical world. Starting from the\u003cbr\u003eprinciples of Symbolism and the relations which are necessary between\u003cbr\u003ewords and things in any language, it applies the result of this inquiry to\u003cbr\u003evarious departments of traditional philosophy, showing in each case how\u003cbr\u003etraditional philosophy and traditional solutions arise out of ignorance of\u003cbr\u003ethe principles of Symbolism and out of misuse of language.\u003cbr\u003eThe logical structure of propositions and the nature of logical inference\u003cbr\u003eare first dealt with. Thence we pass successively to Theory of\u003cbr\u003eKnowledge, Principles of Physics, Ethics, and finally the Mystical (das\u003cbr\u003eMystische).\u003cbr\u003eIn order to understand Mr Wittgenstein’s book, it is necessary to realize\u003cbr\u003ewhat is the problem with which he is concerned. In the part of his\u003cbr\u003etheory which deals with Symbolism he is concerned with the conditions\u003cbr\u003ewhich would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language. There are\u003cbr\u003evarious problems as regards language. First, there is the problem what\u003cbr\u003eactually occurs in our minds when we use language with the intention\u003cbr\u003eof meaning something by it; this problem belongs to psychology. Secondly,\u003cbr\u003ethere is the problem as to what is the relation subsisting between\u003cbr\u003ethoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean; this\u003cbr\u003eproblem belongs to epistemology. Thirdly, there is the problem of using\u003cbr\u003esentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to\u003cbr\u003ethe special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in\u003cbr\u003equestion. Fourthly, there is the question: what relation must one fact\u003cbr\u003e(such as a sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a\u003cbr\u003esymbol for that other? This last is a logical question, and is the one with\u003cbr\u003ewhich Mr Wittgenstein is concerned. He is concerned with the conditions\u003cbr\u003efor accurate Symbolism, i.e. for Symbolism in which a sentence “means”\u003cbr\u003esomething quite definite. In practice, language is always more or less\u003cbr\u003evague, so that what we assert is never quite precise. Thus, logic has two\u003cbr\u003eproblems to deal with in regard to Symbolism: (1) the conditions for\u003cbr\u003esense rather than nonsense in combinations of symbols; (2) the conditions\u003cbr\u003efor uniqueness of meaning or reference in symbols or combinations\u003cbr\u003eof symbols. A logically perfect language has rules of syntax which prevent\u003cbr\u003enonsense, and has single symbols which always have a definite and\u003cbr\u003eunique meaning. Mr Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a\u003cbr\u003elogically perfect language—not that any language is logically perfect, or\u003cbr\u003ethat we believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing a logically\u003cbr\u003eperfect language, but that the whole function of language is to have\u003cbr\u003emeaning, and it only fulfils this function in proportion as it approaches\u003cbr\u003eto the ideal language which we postulate.\u003cbr\u003eThe essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given the\u003cbr\u003esyntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is determinate as soon\u003cbr\u003eas the meaning of the component words is known. In order that a certain\u003cbr\u003esentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language\u003cbr\u003emay be constructed, be something in common between the structure of\u003cbr\u003ethe sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most\u003cbr\u003efundamental thesis of Mr Wittgenstein’s theory. That which has to be\u003cbr\u003ein common between the sentence and the fact cannot, so he contends,\u003cbr\u003ebe itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be\u003cbr\u003eshown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same\u003cbr\u003estructure.\u003cbr\u003eThe first requisite of an ideal language would be that there should be\u003cbr\u003eone name for every simple, and never the same name for two different\u003cbr\u003esimples. A name is a simple symbol in the sense that it has no parts\u003cbr\u003ewhich are themselves symbols. In a logically perfect language nothing\u003cbr\u003ethat is not simple will have a simple symbol. The symbol for the whole\u003cbr\u003ewill be a “complex,” containing the symbols for the parts. In speaking\u003cbr\u003eof a “complex” we are, as will appear later, sinning against the rules\u003cbr\u003eof philosophical grammar, but this is unavoidable at the outset. “Most\u003cbr\u003epropositions and questions that have been written about philosophical\u003cbr\u003ematters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions\u003cbr\u003eof this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions\u003cbr\u003eand propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not\u003cbr\u003eunderstand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the","brand":"All classic book warehouse","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47146032070896,"sku":"2940014478823","price":0.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/2940014478823_p0.jpg?v=1763609396","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/2940014478823","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}