{"product_id":"2940148944072","title":"CORPS LEVEL OPERATIONAL ART IN VIETNAM: A STUDY OF II FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS DURING MAJOR NAMED OPERATIONS","description":"This monograph explores two major U.S. operations and the reaction to one enemy offensive, in \u003cbr\u003eorder to explore evidence of U.S. operational art in Vietnam. For the purpose of this study, the \u003cbr\u003eoperational level is identified as the corps headquarters responsible for nesting Military \u003cbr\u003eAssistance Command–Vietnam’s ( MACV) military guidance, the strategic direction issued by \u003cbr\u003ethe Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national government’s aims with the tactical maneuver of \u003cbr\u003esubordinate divisions and battalions. During the Vietnam War, the Field Force served as the \u003cbr\u003eequivalent of the corps headquarters. The three case studies analyzed are all drawn from II Field \u003cbr\u003eForce during the period 1967 to 1971. These case studies are OPERATION CEDAR FALLS\/\u003cbr\u003eJUNCTION CITY (1967), the 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia under OPERATION TOAN \u003cbr\u003eTHANG, and II Field Force’s reaction to the Tet offensive (1968). Through the analysis of the \u003cbr\u003ecase studies, the question of operational art existing at the corps level during the Vietnam War is \u003cbr\u003eaddressed, as is the identification of successful or unsuccessful leadership and staff practices \u003cbr\u003efaced in an asymmetric conflict.","brand":"ReadCycle","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47169772978416,"sku":"2940148944072","price":2.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/2940148944072_p0.jpg?v=1763710271","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/2940148944072","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}