{"product_id":"9783631345740","title":"The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations","description":"\u003cp\u003eUsing a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der W","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47057121214704,"sku":"9783631345740","price":110.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/9783631345740_p0.jpg?v=1763727128","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/9783631345740","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}