{"product_id":"9783832525156","title":"Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism","description":"\u003cp\u003eThe subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking - a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called \"epistemic absolutism\". So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results - notably the well-known externalism\/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Logos Verlag","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47035497251056,"sku":"9783832525156","price":52.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/9783832525156_p0.jpg?v=1763687198","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/9783832525156","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}