{"product_id":"9789814401593","title":"Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-matching To Uncoupled Dynamics: From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics","description":"\u003cp\u003eThis volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called \u003ci\u003eregret-matching\u003c\/i\u003e, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding — boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run — generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: \u003ci\u003euncoupledness\u003c\/i\u003e, whereby decision-makers do not know each other's payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of “regret”).\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSimple Adaptive Strategies\u003c\/i\u003e is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses — in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering — and for further research.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eContents:\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eCorrelated Equilibria:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003eExistence of Correlated Equilibria \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eRegret Matching:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA General Class of Adaptive Strategies \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRegret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGeneral Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria \u003ci\u003e(Amotz Cahn)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eUncoupled Dynamics:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria \u003ci\u003e(Yakov Babichenko)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHow Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eDynamics and Equilibria:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAdaptive Heuristics \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eNash Equilibrium and Dynamics \u003ci\u003e(Sergiu Hart)\u003c\/i\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eReadership:\u003c\/b\u003e Graduate students and researchers in game theory, economic theory, econometrics, computer science and engineering.\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47185283809520,"sku":"9789814401593","price":48.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/9789814401593_p0.jpg?v=1763690748","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/9789814401593","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}