{"product_id":"9789814447584","title":"Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Market: Selected Papers On Bilateral And Multilateral Bargaining: Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBargaining in the Shadow of the Market — Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining\u003c\/i\u003e consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cb\u003eContents:\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHow Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComparison of Arbitration Procedures: Models with Complete and Incomplete Information\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIncentive Compatibility in Bargaining Under Uncertainty\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBargaining under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eReadership:\u003c\/b\u003e Advanced economics undergraduates, graduate and research communities interested in the field of bargaining, micro-economic theory and game theory.\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47143739130096,"sku":"9789814447584","price":38.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/9789814447584_p0.jpg?v=1763691056","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/9789814447584","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}