{"product_id":"9789814525060","title":"Game Theory And Mechanism Design","description":"\u003cp\u003eThis book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence\/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cb\u003eContents:\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003eIntroduction and Overview\u003c\/li\u003e\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eNon-Cooperative Game Theory:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eKey Notions in Game Theory\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExtensive Form Games\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStrategic Form Games\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDominant Strategy Equilibria\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePure Strategy Nash Equilibria\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUtility Theory\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMatrix Games\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExistence of Nash Equilibrium\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComputation of Nash Equilibria\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComplexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBayesian Games\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eMechanism Design:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIntroduction to Mechanism Design\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIncentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMechanism Design Space in Quasilinear Environment\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAuctions\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eOptimal Mechanisms and Myerson Auction\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplementation in Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFurther Topics in Mechanism Design\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eCooperative Game Theory:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCorrelated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Two Person Bargaining Problem\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCoalitional Games with Transferable Utility\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Core of Coalitional Games\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Shapley Value\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eOther Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStable Matching\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEpilogue\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMathematical Preliminaries\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eReadership:\u003c\/b\u003e Senior undergraduate, first year master's, and first year research students, academics and industrial researchers in computer science, computer engineering, networks and communications, artificial intelligence\/machine learning, operations research, industrial engineering, management science, and microeconomics.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eKey Features:\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFirst of its kind to include a balanced treatment of noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, as well as mechanism design\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIncorporates a large number of apt, illustrative examples to facilitate an immediate and comprehensive understanding of the concepts and ideas\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExamples chosen carefully from traditional and modern topics in computer science, networks, and microeconomics\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIncludes biographical sketches of leading game theorists at appropriate places\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47185298424048,"sku":"9789814525060","price":34.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0737\/7593\/9824\/files\/9789814525060_p0.jpg?v=1763691800","url":"https:\/\/shop-qa.barnesandnoble.com\/products\/9789814525060","provider":"Barnes \u0026 Noble (DEV)","version":"1.0","type":"link"}