1
/
of
1
OGB
ARISTOTLE
ARISTOTLE
Regular price
$1.99 USD
Regular price
Sale price
$1.99 USD
Shipping calculated at checkout.
Quantity
Couldn't load pickup availability
Scanned, proofed and corrected from the original hardcover edition for enjoyable reading. (Worth every penny spent!)
***
An excerpt from the third chapter:
ii. The Principle of Contradiction.
The principle of contradiction is selected by Aristotle as the supreme and most important and fundamental common axiom. The consideration of this principle falls within the scope of metaphysic, which, more specifically, is regarded by Aristotle as having for its object being-as-such. The treatment of common axioms in general is regarded by him as forming part of metaphysic; but, in particular, the principle of contradiction falls within that part of philosophy because it connects directly with being as-such. The principle itself is formulated by Aristotle with a rather definite objective reference—' The same thing cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.' Such an axiom is also the most firm principle of knowledge or thinking; for it implies that it is impossible for the human mind to think that what is true is at the same time, in the same sense, in the same reference, false. The fundamental opposition between true and false has the double reference. It is incompletely expressed if not taken both with respect to the nature of things and at the same time with respect to apprehension of that nature of things. These, in Aristotle's view, are always correlative; but, if a priority is to be assigned to either, it must be accorded to the objective aspect, the nature of things.
The same axiom, when due attention is paid to the notions of truth and falsity occurring in it, implies a further generality—that which later logicians separated off as the law or principle of Excluded Middle. When they are properly defined there is no third possibility between the true and the false. Aristotle, in handling this implication of the principle of contradiction, approaches the highly important speculative proposition that all assertions which have as their apparent subject the universe, the sum-total of reality, are meaningless. The principle of contradiction from its nature cannot admit of proof. Those who seek for such, says Aristotle, exhibit only their ignorance of what is meant by proving. He who rejects it, then, cannot be dislodged from his position by a demonstration which shall directly establish the truth of the principle. He can be refuted only indirectly, by showing that it is either impossible or absurd for him to retain the position of rejecting the principle. For the purpose of this indirect confirmation of the principle it is sufficient to insist that its opponent shall allow that the terms or notions he employs have a definite meaning. If he uses any term at all, with the admission that it has a meaning, then, Aristotle thinks, it is possible to make clear to him that he must admit the truth of the principle of contradiction. If he will not allow that terms or notions have any meaning, then it is evident that he rejects thinking in toto, must resign the use of speech, and is no better than a plant. For if his terms or notions have a meaning, whatever they mean is distinguishable from their corresponding negatives, and it must therefore be impossible that one and the same term or notion can at the same time mean both the positive and negative. The possibility of thinking at all, Aristotle seems to say, depends on the admission that there is a certain fixity of significance in terms or notions, and this in the long-run is equivalent to the fixity of the nature of that which is. Thinking, in other words, is but the apprehension of what is; and, if there be no distinction between what a thing is and what it is not, thinking becomes impossible, and we are not even in a position to reject the principle of contradiction. "We have neither thoughts nor terms whereby to express our rejection, if such thoughts and terms have no fixity of meaning.
Thus the principle of contradiction is an axiom of thought only on account of the intimate correlation between thinking as a process of apprehending and the nature of things to be apprehended. Aristotle is far removed from the position sometimes taken in purely formal logic, according to which the principle of contradiction is the expression only of a condition under which the subjective activity of thinking proceeds. It is, indeed, and has always been found, impossible in any way to extract from the notion of thinking as a merely subjective activity the principle of contradiction. In the Aristotelian view, however, that principle manifests its fundamental character only when thinking in general is taken as an element, it may be an all-pervading element, in the process of apprehending reality. A severance of thinking from reality is altogether foreign to Aristotle.
***
An excerpt from the third chapter:
ii. The Principle of Contradiction.
The principle of contradiction is selected by Aristotle as the supreme and most important and fundamental common axiom. The consideration of this principle falls within the scope of metaphysic, which, more specifically, is regarded by Aristotle as having for its object being-as-such. The treatment of common axioms in general is regarded by him as forming part of metaphysic; but, in particular, the principle of contradiction falls within that part of philosophy because it connects directly with being as-such. The principle itself is formulated by Aristotle with a rather definite objective reference—' The same thing cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.' Such an axiom is also the most firm principle of knowledge or thinking; for it implies that it is impossible for the human mind to think that what is true is at the same time, in the same sense, in the same reference, false. The fundamental opposition between true and false has the double reference. It is incompletely expressed if not taken both with respect to the nature of things and at the same time with respect to apprehension of that nature of things. These, in Aristotle's view, are always correlative; but, if a priority is to be assigned to either, it must be accorded to the objective aspect, the nature of things.
The same axiom, when due attention is paid to the notions of truth and falsity occurring in it, implies a further generality—that which later logicians separated off as the law or principle of Excluded Middle. When they are properly defined there is no third possibility between the true and the false. Aristotle, in handling this implication of the principle of contradiction, approaches the highly important speculative proposition that all assertions which have as their apparent subject the universe, the sum-total of reality, are meaningless. The principle of contradiction from its nature cannot admit of proof. Those who seek for such, says Aristotle, exhibit only their ignorance of what is meant by proving. He who rejects it, then, cannot be dislodged from his position by a demonstration which shall directly establish the truth of the principle. He can be refuted only indirectly, by showing that it is either impossible or absurd for him to retain the position of rejecting the principle. For the purpose of this indirect confirmation of the principle it is sufficient to insist that its opponent shall allow that the terms or notions he employs have a definite meaning. If he uses any term at all, with the admission that it has a meaning, then, Aristotle thinks, it is possible to make clear to him that he must admit the truth of the principle of contradiction. If he will not allow that terms or notions have any meaning, then it is evident that he rejects thinking in toto, must resign the use of speech, and is no better than a plant. For if his terms or notions have a meaning, whatever they mean is distinguishable from their corresponding negatives, and it must therefore be impossible that one and the same term or notion can at the same time mean both the positive and negative. The possibility of thinking at all, Aristotle seems to say, depends on the admission that there is a certain fixity of significance in terms or notions, and this in the long-run is equivalent to the fixity of the nature of that which is. Thinking, in other words, is but the apprehension of what is; and, if there be no distinction between what a thing is and what it is not, thinking becomes impossible, and we are not even in a position to reject the principle of contradiction. "We have neither thoughts nor terms whereby to express our rejection, if such thoughts and terms have no fixity of meaning.
Thus the principle of contradiction is an axiom of thought only on account of the intimate correlation between thinking as a process of apprehending and the nature of things to be apprehended. Aristotle is far removed from the position sometimes taken in purely formal logic, according to which the principle of contradiction is the expression only of a condition under which the subjective activity of thinking proceeds. It is, indeed, and has always been found, impossible in any way to extract from the notion of thinking as a merely subjective activity the principle of contradiction. In the Aristotelian view, however, that principle manifests its fundamental character only when thinking in general is taken as an element, it may be an all-pervading element, in the process of apprehending reality. A severance of thinking from reality is altogether foreign to Aristotle.
Share
