"Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon

The Leavenworth Papers is a series of historical studies undertaken by the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College’s Combat Studies Institute that examines subjects of concern to the Army.
This latest Leavenworth Paper examines the US. military intervention in the 1958 Lebanese political
crisis. By focusing on a relatively recent Army experience in planning and conducting a major contingency operation, the study illuminates the complexity of military planning and the incongruity between plans and performance. This focus promotes the value of the historical perspective in dealing with contemporary military subjects and provides a timely opportunity to apply the lessons of the past.

“Not War, But Like War” offers insights that are readily applicable to today’s military planners at all
levels. The disparity between the political purpose and the military objective of intervention will illustrate
why national and service level planners must carefully describe what is to be accomplished by
theater military forces. Theater and tactical level commanders and planners will be reminded that the
nature of joint operations demands detailed preparation of command and logistical arrangements and
concerted operations. Finally, the study demonstrates that responsive contingency planning also
depends upon a process that promotes both participant dialogue and repetitive review in order to lessen the dangers of “provisionalism.”
The Lebanese contingency operation represents a gauge to measure the effectiveness of our planning doctrine for the 1980s. Future contingencies will likely involve more demanding requirements and confront more hostile environments than those of Lebanon in 1958. This study allows us to measure and to reflect upon the doctrinal implications of contingency planning down through the tactical unit level. It can contribute directly to more effective deployment as wall as employment of land combat power.