RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE CAUCASUS

The Caucasus region consists of the new
independent states of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia) and the Russian federal region of
the Northern Caucasus, including war-torn Chechnya.
In the post-Soviet period, it has become one of the
most volatile and potentially unstable regions in world
politics. Fragile state structures, a series of unresolved
or “frozen” secessionist conflicts, and widespread
poverty generate popular dissatisfaction and political
instability. The region covers a major “fault line”
between Christian and Islamic civilizations, and
confessional rivalry, together with the rise of Islamic
radicalism, have become sources of friction. Despite
these inherent challenges, the hydrocarbon reserves of
the Caspian basin also have attracted significant great
power competitive engagement.
The United States and the Russian Federation
pursue assertive regional policies in the Caucasus.
At present, both Washington and Moscow tend to
define their interests in such a way as to ensure that
their relationship in the region will be contentious. The
questions of access to the oil and natural gas reserves
of the Caspian, Russia’s role in the geopolitical space
of the former Soviet Union, the Western military role
in the unstable regions along the Russian Federation’s
southern flank, and strategies for pursuing a war on
terrorism in Inner Asia all have the potential to become
serious apples of discord.
A zero-sum “Great Game” for leverage in so fragile
an area, however, is not in the best interests of either
major external actors or the region’s peoples. Nor does
it accurately reflect the dynamics that could be working to redefine the U.S.-Russian relationship beyond the
Cold War. Washington and Moscow should seek to
find a modus vivendi that will recast their regional roles
within a broader framework that allows for mutually
beneficial cooperation in areas of joint interest as well
as healthy competition.