GOVERNANCE, IDENTITY, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: EVIDENCE FROM RAMADI AND TAL AFAR

With the last departure of U.S. combat forces from
Iraq in 2011 and a drawdown in Afghanistan already
underway, the current era of American counterinsurgency
may be coming to a close. At the same time, irregular
threats to U.S. national interests remain, and
the future may hold yet more encounters with insurgents
for the U.S. military. Accordingly, the latest
Defense strategic guidance has called on the Department
of Defense (DoD) to “retain and continue to
refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized
capabilities” from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This monograph is a contribution to this ongoing
effort to institutionalize the military’s understanding
of counterinsurgency, building on its hard-won recent
experience. Michael Fitzsimmons examines two case
studies drawn from some of the darkest months of
conflict in Iraq to illuminate an important refinement
of traditional counterinsurgency theory and doctrine:
that when it comes to building legitimacy, “good governance”
may take a back seat to the politics of ethnic
and religious identity. Dr. Fitzsimmons’s use of comparative
case studies and a simple framework for systematically
reviewing evidence accumulated through
first-hand accounts of strategy, operations, and tactics,
should serve as a compelling model for what will
likely be many studies in the years to come of the U.S.
military’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.