Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak

The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of
military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Qperattons, acknowiedges
that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in
World War IL. WImiEe its ~ueeess is widely recognized, there are
few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception.
Sauiet Qperatio~zal Deception: The Bed Clsak, by Lieutenant
Colonel Richard N. Armstrong, examines the role of operational
deception in the Red Army’s World War II victories. This
Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operational level
deception planning, allocation of resources, and deception
measures used derring battle in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation
erf July 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong’s insightful study
demonstrates the clear connection between the wise use of deception
and Soviet battlefield success.