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THE U.S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958: A COMMANDER'S REMINISCENCE
THE U.S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958: A COMMANDER'S REMINISCENCE
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In the summer of 1982, the Director, Combat Studies Institute, assigned me the task of writing
a Leavenworth Paper on rapid deployment logistics, using the US intervention in Lebanon in
1958 as a case study. Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it
only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in
Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon. In the
course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in
the operation. Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted.
General Gray said in his initial response that he would reply at a later date, after he had had
time to review his papers and comb his memory in order to prepare as thorough and accurate a
narrative as possible. When his reply arrived, it totaled over one-hundred handwritten pages.
In addition to providing answers to my specific questions about logistics, General Gray provided
his recollections of the Lebanon operation and a critique of Leavenworth Paper No. 3. His
manuscript not only contained a detailed and candid account of his activities, but amplified, elaborated, and sometimes disputed Dr, Spiller's work. In this sense, it is both an important eyewitness account and a companion piece.to Leavenworth Paper Mo 3. The reader of both publications will benefit from being able to draw upon the scholarly work of a trained historian and the memoir of an actual participant. The historical record could not be better served.
a Leavenworth Paper on rapid deployment logistics, using the US intervention in Lebanon in
1958 as a case study. Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it
only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in
Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon. In the
course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in
the operation. Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted.
General Gray said in his initial response that he would reply at a later date, after he had had
time to review his papers and comb his memory in order to prepare as thorough and accurate a
narrative as possible. When his reply arrived, it totaled over one-hundred handwritten pages.
In addition to providing answers to my specific questions about logistics, General Gray provided
his recollections of the Lebanon operation and a critique of Leavenworth Paper No. 3. His
manuscript not only contained a detailed and candid account of his activities, but amplified, elaborated, and sometimes disputed Dr, Spiller's work. In this sense, it is both an important eyewitness account and a companion piece.to Leavenworth Paper Mo 3. The reader of both publications will benefit from being able to draw upon the scholarly work of a trained historian and the memoir of an actual participant. The historical record could not be better served.
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