1
/
of
1
ReadCycle
Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations
Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations
Regular price
$2.99 USD
Regular price
Sale price
$2.99 USD
Shipping calculated at checkout.
Quantity
Couldn't load pickup availability
John McGrath’s Troop Density is a very timely historical analysis.
While the value of history is indeed timeless, this paper clearly shows the
immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most
common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few
troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is
no standard against which to judge. Too few troops compared to what?
Too few troops compared to which historical analogy? Too few troops
compared to which policy maker or retired general’s book?
A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned
as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at
with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations
from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military
forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would
generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out
a variety of important factors affecting those numbers–from geography to
local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use
of contractors–among others.
A segment of the American military historian population and policy
makers have been and are enamored with a genre of military history which
seeks to quantify war, reduce it to known variables, and posit solutions
to future military conflicts based on mathematical formulae. It would be
tempting to seize upon McGrath’s analysis and brandish it as a club with
which to beat one’s opponents. This study should not be looked at in that
light.
The practice of war contains a strong element of science and social
science, but in the end the practice of war is an art. This study cannot be
used to guarantee victory by simply putting a certain number of soldiers
“on the ground” relative to the indigenous population. The percentages and
numbers in the study are merely historical averages, with all the dangers
inherent in any average figure. One would do well to remember that old
adage about the six-foot tall statistician who drowned in the river, which
was on average only five feet deep.
While the value of history is indeed timeless, this paper clearly shows the
immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most
common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few
troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is
no standard against which to judge. Too few troops compared to what?
Too few troops compared to which historical analogy? Too few troops
compared to which policy maker or retired general’s book?
A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned
as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at
with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations
from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military
forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would
generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out
a variety of important factors affecting those numbers–from geography to
local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use
of contractors–among others.
A segment of the American military historian population and policy
makers have been and are enamored with a genre of military history which
seeks to quantify war, reduce it to known variables, and posit solutions
to future military conflicts based on mathematical formulae. It would be
tempting to seize upon McGrath’s analysis and brandish it as a club with
which to beat one’s opponents. This study should not be looked at in that
light.
The practice of war contains a strong element of science and social
science, but in the end the practice of war is an art. This study cannot be
used to guarantee victory by simply putting a certain number of soldiers
“on the ground” relative to the indigenous population. The percentages and
numbers in the study are merely historical averages, with all the dangers
inherent in any average figure. One would do well to remember that old
adage about the six-foot tall statistician who drowned in the river, which
was on average only five feet deep.
Share
