CORPS LEVEL OPERATIONAL ART IN VIETNAM: A STUDY OF II FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS DURING MAJOR NAMED OPERATIONS

This monograph explores two major U.S. operations and the reaction to one enemy offensive, in
order to explore evidence of U.S. operational art in Vietnam. For the purpose of this study, the
operational level is identified as the corps headquarters responsible for nesting Military
Assistance Command–Vietnam’s ( MACV) military guidance, the strategic direction issued by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national government’s aims with the tactical maneuver of
subordinate divisions and battalions. During the Vietnam War, the Field Force served as the
equivalent of the corps headquarters. The three case studies analyzed are all drawn from II Field
Force during the period 1967 to 1971. These case studies are OPERATION CEDAR FALLS/
JUNCTION CITY (1967), the 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia under OPERATION TOAN
THANG, and II Field Force’s reaction to the Tet offensive (1968). Through the analysis of the
case studies, the question of operational art existing at the corps level during the Vietnam War is
addressed, as is the identification of successful or unsuccessful leadership and staff practices
faced in an asymmetric conflict.