The Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements

The question of whether aesthetic judgements are simply statements about subjective preferences or whether they have some non-subjective basis is one of the most important questions of aesthetics and, indeed, of philosophy. On the one hand, every aesthetic judgement seems as good as any other. If, for example, you like a modern pop artist, who is to say that your judgement that the artist's music is great is wrong? On the other hand, the judgement that then oeuvre is greater than that of J.S. Bach seems to be clearly mistaken. This volume brings together some of the leading contemporary philosophers of art and philosophers of language to debate the status of aesthetic judgement's. Are they simply expressions of personal preference? Is there more basis for saying that a painting is beautiful or serene than there is for saying that a cake is tasty? Is disagreement about aesthetic judgements faultless or can someone be mistaken about the aesthetic value of an artwork?