The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan

Britain's 'hearts and minds' approach to counterinsurgency was credited with rare successes against insurgencies in Malaya (1948-60) and Northern Ireland (1969-2007). The army's approach to peacekeeping in Yugoslavia during the nineties was also deemed effective. The British military's less coercive approach to counter-insurgency influenced the development of US counterinsurgency thinking on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Paradoxically, just as Britain was seen to be influential on US counterinsurgency thinking, the Army appeared to be failing to create stability in Southern Iraq and had to withdraw. The 'good war' in Afghanistan failed to restore Britain's reputation for success in counterinsurgency operations.

This timely book challenges orthodox British 'hearts and minds' counterinsurgency theory. Regional experts suggest that Britain's classic, sixties counterinsurgency theory-drawing on the 'lessons' of Malaya - could not explain Britain's success in Northern Ireland or provide a useful guide to the complexities of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thematic specialists raise questions about the suitability of the military for humanitarian interventions. The book also includes analysis of the impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on the militarisation of domestic British society, particularly its implications for British democracy.