Studies in Political and Military Incompetence

The diplomatic failures leading up to the invasion of Iraq and its insurgency aftermath have a long history. An incredible number of wars attest to the remarkable stubbornness of leaders presented with intelligence warnings that they are headed for trouble. There is a strong regularity of senior officials being taken by surprise simply out of sheer obstinacy in sticking to a false, preconceived notion. It has been estimated that decisions of elite governmental decision-makers to involve themselves in a war have involved major errors of fact, perhaps in more than 50% of all cases.

This study analyzes the causes of such incompetent political decision-making. Specifically, it analyses impediments to the effective interpretation of intelligence information and assesses the propensity of certain leaders to selectively process intelligence in order to initiate premature and unwarranted military intervention. Psychological, social and organizational factors that contribute to decision-makers' premature aggression, acquiescence to erroneous normative demands, and obstinacy in maintaining false, preconceived notions were empirically analyzed. Psycho-political profiles developed included "The Cheney Syndrome."

The first section of this book consists of a review of examples of governmental decision-making failures. The second section consists of an experimental analysis of these factors. 313 U.S. military officers completed a gaming exercise involving a terrorist crisis that also included a battery of psychological, social and political ideology measures. Officers' propensities to institute premature punitive measures based on minimal, ambiguous information as well as to acquiesce to erroneous authoritative demands were assessed.

While documenting a solid background of examples of pathologies in decision-making and intelligence analysis, this study moved beyond the anecdotal nature of the case study approach. The presentation of the given terrorist scenario to each study participant allowed the same crisis situation to be repeated hundreds of times while varying the political, social, and psychological factors affecting decision-making and intelligence analysis. This allowed for a high degree of explanation and prediction of decision-making behaviors. The results of this study offer strong evidence of the value of utilizing a contextual approach to political and military psychology research.